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NOTE
Criminal Law-PLAINTIFFS UNDER FLORIDA RICO MUST MEET
TRADITIONAL EQUITY REQUIREMENTS WHEN SEEKING TEMPORARY
INJUNCTIONS TO SAFEGUARD ASSETS-Finkelstein v. Southeast
Bank, 490 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
The Fourth District Court of Appeal recently held in Finkelstein
v. Southeast Bank' that a private plaintiff suing under the Florida
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act or the
Anti-Fencing Act could not obtain temporary injunctive relief bar-
ring a defendant from disposing of private trust fund assets unless
the plaintiff demonstrated a clear legal right to trust moneys. The
plaintiff must assert that the defendant violated the Florida RICO
Act or the Anti-Fencing Act, that the trust fund proceeds were a
product of that illegal activity, that an immediate danger of signifi-
cant loss would occur unless an injunction were granted, and that
there was no adequate remedy at law. Finally, the injunction must
be issued in the public interest.'
Finkelstein is a disturbing decision because of the court's analy-
sis and the misapplication of Florida's RICO statute. In this Note
the author analyzes the common law which prefigured the Florida
RICO Act, discusses how the statute altered the common law, ex-
plains how the Fourth District Court of Appeal misconstrued the
statute, and suggests how courts can correctly determine whether
plaintiffs suing under Florida RICO are entitled to a preliminary
injunction.
I. THE FACTS OF Finkelstein
Southeast Bank sued Paul Finkelstein, Lawrence Austin, and
others under the Florida RICO Act and the Anti-Fencing Act.8
Southeast alleged that Finkelstein ran a "boiler room opera-
tion"-a telephone sales solicitation scheme in which gems were
misrepresented as investment grade and sold at "outrageously high
prices. 14 Credit card sales were processed by Southeast Bank and
1. 490 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
2. Id. at 984.
3. Id. at 978.
4. Id.
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customer accounts were charged. The cardholders complained to
Southeast and the bank subsequently brought suit. The gravamen
of Southeast's complaint was that Finkelstein had "made unautho-
rized charges against the credit card customers. ' 5
The facts central to the dispute in Finkelstein began to unfold
in earnest when Southeast amended its complaint adding Margaret
Finkelstein and her daughter as defendants. Southeast alleged that
Margaret Finkelstein had attempted to sequester Finkelstein fam-
ily trust funds and that the trust was an enterprise under the Flor-
ida RICO statute.' At trial Southeast introduced evidence connect-
ing Margaret Finkelstein to alleged RICO activity. For example,
"she received a weekly paycheck for services which she did not
perform." The record was unclear as to whether those checks were
connected to the Finkelstein family trust. Southeast did establish,
however, that the $31,000 in trust "represented the profits of rack-
eteering." Margaret Finkelstein was unable to introduce any evi-
dence to rebut Southeast's claim, although she testified that the
$31,000 "came from a safety deposit box and represented addi-
tional proceeds from the sale of her stock."9 Based on this evi-
dence, the trial court temporarily enjoined disposal of the principal
of the Finkelstein family trust.'0
On appeal, Margaret Finkelstein contended that the trial court
erred in granting the injunction because Southeast had failed to
offer sufficient evidence to connect Margaret Finkelstein or the
Finkelstein family trust to any RICO violations." The Fourth Dis-
trict framed the issue as "whether an injunction may be issued
prior to judgment barring appellants from disposing of assets in a
private trust fund, in order to preserve sums for collection should
appellee prevail on its claims of RICO violations or theft.' 2 Based
largely on common law requirements for injunctive relief, the court
held that although such an injunction could be obtained, Southeast
Bank had not met the requirements necessary for one to issue.' s
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 981.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 978-79. The trial court did, however, permit the beneficiaries of the Finkelstein
family trust to "receive the interest income from the trust." Id. at 979.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 984. The traditional requirements of clear legal right, inadequate remedy at
law, and consideration of the public interest were imposed by the court. What the Fourth
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The district court made two fundamental errors. First the court
analyzed case law concerning the federal RICO statute, a statute
which, unlike its Florida counterpart, contains no express provision
for private injunctive relief.14 In so doing the court misconstrued
Florida's RICO statute and failed to provide injunctive relief for
Southeast Bank. The second error was ignoring the body of equity
jurisprudence which the Florida RICO Act sought to change.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION
The temporary injunction is in part the product of the ponder-
ous nature of the Anglo-Saxon legal system.15 If plaintiffs could be
confident of speedy relief, there would be no need for tribunals to
concern themselves with preserving the status quo prior to litiga-
tion.1 6 However, as society becomes more litigious and court dock-
ets become increasingly crowded, making dispute resolution dis-
tant and uncertain, the number of requests for injunctive relief
increases.
A fundamental feature of the temporary injunction is that the
application of the remedy always entails a dilemma. It is clear that
irreparable loss of legal rights should be minimized during litiga-
tion; however, judicial interference "with the position of the par-
ties prior to a merit adjudication" may violate due process rights.
In addition, there is an enhanced likelihood of judicial error."
Throughout the history of temporary injunctions, the tension be-
tween these two interests has been ubiquitous, if often
unacknowledged.
The classic English requirements for a temporary injunction in-
volved a series of inquiries which courts addressed sequentially.
Courts would determine whether the plaintiff could "demon-
strat[e] a sufficient probability of right, and, assuming that thresh-
old test was met, [the courts would] further inquir[e] as to the ade-
quacy of damages or other relief, and what the relative position of
the parties would be if interlocutory relief was not (prospectively)
District altered through its interpretation of the Florida RICO Act was the factor of "irrepa-
rable damage," which it replaced with the requirement of "immediate danger of significant
loss." See FLA. STAT. § 895.05(6) (1985).
14. Finkelstein, 490 So. 2d at 979.
15. Hammond, Interlocutory Injunctions: Time for a New Model?, 30 U. TORONTO L.J.
240 (1980). The author further states that the popularity of the remedy today is attributable
to "an overloaded civil litigation system." Id. at 260.
16. Id. "There is no need for interlocutory relief when the access can be had speedily, on
the merits, to an appropriate forum." Id.
17. Id. at 272.
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granted."1 The first requirement, that of probability of success on
the merits, reflects the notion that "equity is a gloss on, and comes
in aid of, the common law."'19 Although the chancellor theoretically
represented the conscience of the sovereign, he was loath to inter-
fere with a court of competent jurisdiction if a case was frivolous.3 0
The requirement of success on the merits can thus be seen as a
screening device which reflected nineteenth century notions of
comity. As to the degree of the probability of success, scholars
have disagreed.2 1 One commentator has observed that the require-
ment initially was "something less than a prima facie case" and
that it "was not then conceived of as a threshold test. 2 2 However,
by the mid-nineteenth century a stronger showing of success on
the merits was required, and by the close of the century the plain-
tiff, as a preliminary matter, had to make out a strong prima facie
case "in the sense that if evidence remained as it was on the affida-
vits in support of the motion he would in all probability get judg-
ment in his favour. '23
In the United States, development of the temporary injunction
was slow, owing primarily to the colonists' initial aversion to equity
jurisprudence.2 4 Courts mechanically applied English precedents
with scant concern for their suitability.2' Until the twentieth cen-
tury, courts in the United States applied the classic English
model. 6 Subsequently, however, at the federal court level, three
different approaches emerged. 27 The first is the sequential ap-
18. Id. at 240.
19. Id. at 276.
20. Id. at 275-76.
21. Id. at 242.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 243.
24. Id. at 246-47. There were a number of reasons for this aversion.
Among the English common people there was a deeply rooted sentiment of at-
tachment to the Saxon trial by jury and of aversion to the 'one-man power' of
adjudication. The colonists who settled America brought something of this senti-
ment with them; there appears in the colonial age to have been a real fear of the
Court of Chancery as a possible engine for arbitrary power. In [sic] added nothing
to chancery's popularity that some governors in the colonies used the chancery
court (again in its old administrative form of a Court of Exchequer) to collect
unpaid quit rents. Then too the equity courts did not travel; they were remote
from the colonists and sat only in the capitals. This in turn led to dreadful delays.
An essay in a New York newspaper, written in 1752, anticipated Dickens by re-
porting rumors of equity suits 'at issue these thirty years past.'
Id. (footnotes omitted).
25. Id. at 247.
26. Id. at 249.
27. Id. at 261.
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proach, which treats the requirements as individual hurdles, each
of which must be cleared before issuing the injunction.2 In con-
trast, the balancing test eschews the probability of success compo-
nent as a threshold requirement, opting instead to balance all re-
quirements simultaneously.2' The seldom-used alternative model
requires a showing of "either (1) probable success on the merits
and possible irreparable injury, or (2) sufficiently serious questions
going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a
balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting
the preliminary relief." 0
Recently, the classical model has undergone change in Britain.
English courts appear to have returned to the notion that a prima
facie case need not be made out prior to the issuance of the injunc-
tion. Today, British equity courts appear to move directly to the
question of convenience. 1
Several conclusions may be drawn from this brief explication of
the history of the temporary injunction in Britain and the United
States. First, the remedy is an equitable one and its formulation
arose in a period of two separate court systems in a society much
less litigious than today's.2 Its extraordinary nature is a direct re-
flection of judicial reluctance by courts of equity towards interfer-
ring with courts of law. Whether the hurdles erected by English
courts for protecting their respective turf are as appropriate today
as they were at the turn of the eighteenth century is debatable.
Second, the remedy has proven to be a flexible one as demon-
strated by the different models employed in the United States as
well as the various permutations which English courts have used.
Indeed, the temporary injunction's resilience demonstrates its sus-
ceptibilty to change without significant harm to its effectiveness as
a remedy.
III. THE TEMPORARY INJUNCTION IN FLORIDA
Florida courts generally consider four factors in granting tempo-
rary injunctions: whether irreparable harm will occur if the injunc-
tion is not issued, whether the party seeking the remedy has a
clear legal right to the injunction, whether the party has no remedy
28. Id.
29. Id. at 262.
30. Id. at 263 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
31. Id. at 258.
32. Id. at 275-76.
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at law, and whether the injunction would be in the public inter-
est.33 In contrast to the English model, however, the four require-
ments are not considered sequentially, and the requirement of
probable success on the merits is not a dispositive threshold test.
A temporary injunction is a speaking motion and must allege
facts necessary to justify issuance.34 "A conclusory allegation of ir-
reparable injury or inadequate legal remedy will not suffice. '35 In
general, a bond must be posted prior to issuance of the injunc-
tion; 8 however, exceptions have been made where a plaintiff has
been unable to provide a bond.3 7
IV. THE MISCHIEF AND THE METHOD
In denying injunctive relief to Southeast Bank, the Fourth Dis-
trict made several errors in construing Florida's RICO statute. The
first was a simple failure to understand section 895.05(6), Florida
Statutes, which permits:
[an] aggrieved person [to] institute a proceeding under subsection
(1). In such proceeding, relief shall be granted in conformity with
the principles that govern the granting of injunctive relief from
threatened loss or damage in other civil cases, except that no
showing of special or irreparable damage to the person shall have
to be made. Upon the execution of proper bond against damages
for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing of imme-
diate danger of significant loss or damage, a temporary re-
straining order and a preliminary injunction may be issued in any
such action before a final determination on the merits."
The court held that the second, rather than the third, sentence of
this provision governed the case. Hence the party seeking a tempo-
rary injunction must be able to comply "with the principles that
govern the granting of injunctive relief from threatened loss or
damage in other civil cases."39 Yet sections 895.05(6), the RICO
33. See J. LITTLE, EQUITABLE AND EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES 78-80 (1980) (citing Wilson
v. Sandstrom, 317 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1975), and Montgomery Pipe & Tube Co. v. Mann, 205
So. 2d 660 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968), as examples of decisions that have used these four
elements).
34. H. TRAWICK, FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 412 (1985).
35. Id. (citing Williams v. Dormany, 126 So. 117 (Fla. 1930); Parrish v. Joyner, 54 So. 2d
50 (Fla. 1951)).
36. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.610(b).
37. J. LITTLE, supra note 33, at 83.
38. FLA. STAT. § 895.05(6) (1985).
39. Finkelstein, 490 So. 2d at 980.
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Act, and 812.035(6), the Anti-Fencing Act, do not require anything
more than posting of a bond and a "showing of immediate danger
of significant loss or damage."40 The court's erroneous engrafting
of the common law requirements for injunctive relief onto these
two statutes presumes that the legislature had nothing more in
mind than codifying the common law. In other words, the legisla-
ture's enactment of the statutes was a redundant and therefore
meaningless act.41
Although critics of the legislative process may wonder if a legis-
lature ever fails to engage in meaningless acts in enacting laws,
several signposts of legislative intent were available to the court.
Unfortunately, the court either ignored these or was simply una-
ware of them. Inexplicably it chose to focus instead on cases con-
struing the federal RICO statute, which was not the vehicle
through which Southeast Bank had sought temporary injunctive
relief. The court would have done well to consider Heydon's
Case,42 a sixteenth century English decision written by Lord Coke.
Heydon's Case, which laid down the famous "mischief rule," em-
ployed the proper methodology for avoiding the pitfalls into which
the Fourth District unfortunately fell. The Court of Exchequer
stated that four factors ought to be considered in discerning the
meaning of a statute:
(1) the common law before the making of the Act,
(2) the mischief and defect for which the common law did not
provide,
(3) the remedy Parliament established, and
(4) the true reason for the remedy.4"
Having considered these four factors, the court should then "make
such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the
remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for contin-
uance of the mischief."44
The utility of Lord Coke's paradigm derives from a basic truth
which it recognizes about lawmaking bodies-that at least in the-
ory, legislatures do not endeavor to expend their time and re-
sources codifying what is already the law. It would be redundant
for them to do so. A statute generally seeks to amend the common
40. FLA. STAT. § 895.05(6) (1985).
41. It is presumed that a legislature would not enact a purposeless and therefore useless
piece of legislation. See State v. Zimmerman, 370 So. 2d 1179, 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
42. 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex. 1584).
43. Id. at 638.
44. Id.
19871
982 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:975
law because of some deficiency. Thus, the ostensible goal of a stat-
ute is to improve existing judge-made law. The achievement of this
goal usually entails some renunciation, however small, of current
precedent. Another more subtle reality underlies Lord Coke's ru-
bric. Judges naturally resist overruling cases because this would
create alterations in precedent. By contrast, legislators, because
they are elected officials, are legitimately empowered to make law.
A legislature can therefore, without reservation, correct preceden-
tial improprieties that a court, for institutional reasons, may be
disinclined to disturb.
The common law of temporary injunctive relief prior to the en-
actment of Florida's RICO Act has already been discussed. What
remains to be examined is the mischief that the common law could
not cure and which the Florida Legislature sought to remedy by
enacting the RICO statute. In this connection, the first and best
place to have sought the legislature's intent would have been the
statute itself." Section 895.05(6) provides the requirements for the
issuance of a temporary injunction and a clue as to the nature of
the mischief the legislature sought to address. The only require-
ments for a temporary injunction under the RICO Act are (1) the
posting of a bond against damages, and (2) a showing of immediate
danger of significant loss or damage.4" The Fourth District failed to
perceive how or why these simple requirements altered the com-
mon law. In short, the court failed to grasp the fact that the stat-
ute skews the likelihood that a temporary injunction will issue to-
ward the party seeking the remedy. But the question remains:
Why would the legislature want to grant the RICO plaintiff greater
ease in obtaining a temporary injunction for the purpose of freez-
ing assets? Or, in the parlance of Lord Coke, was there something
intrinsic about the mischief the legislature sought to remove that
required a loosening of the common law standards for granting an
injunction?
The most obvious reason that the legislature altered the com-
mon law is discernible through a broad reading of the statute. The
45. See Rhodes, White & Goldman, The Search for Intent: Aids to Statutory Construc-
tion in Florida, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. Rzv. 383 (1978). "Where the legislative intent as evidenced
by a statute is plain and unambiguous, then there is no necessity for any construction or
interpretation of the statute, and the courts need only give effect to the plain meaning of its
terms." Id. at 384 (quoting State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973)). The authors state that
"[t]his principle, known as the 'plain meaning rule,' requires judicial determination of statu-
tory ambiguity as a prerequisite to judicial construction." Id.
46. FLA. STAT. § 895.05(6) (1985).
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sine qua non of a RICO violation lies in the phrase "pattern of
racketeering activity," which is defined as "engaging in at least two
incidents of racketeering conduct that have the same or similar in-
tents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or
that otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics
and are not isolated incidents."4 Thus, by definition, the person
charged with a RICO violation is suspected of, and may indeed
have committed, multiple crimes. Consequently, the party against
whom the injunction is being sought may be motivated toward pre-
judgment disposal of assets in order to avoid creditor sequestration
of funds. And if the funds are eventually connected to illegal activ-
ities they may serve as evidence for a conviction resulting in an
award of treble damages.48 It would have been eminently reasona-
ble for the legislature, in view of the type of wrongdoer the RICO
statute is meant to punish, to have relaxed the common law re-
quirements for temporary injunctions so that the plaintiff, at the
close of the lawsuit, would be able to seize some of the moneys he
was deprived of by fraud or theft. In sum, the primary mischief the
statute addresses is the likelihood that a party charged with RICO
violations will get rid of his assets before the RICO plaintiff can
obtain a judgment and attachment. And the true reason for the
remedy is that there may well exist other parties seeking to seques-
ter the defendant's assets who can accomplish this purpose before
a successful adjudication on the merits is ever reached. That is
why the legislature relaxed the common law requirements for the
temporary injunction, and the Fourth District could easily have
reached this conclusion without ever looking beyond the statute
itself.
Another statutory source available to the court for discerning
the problems the legislature sought to solve with the RICO statute
is the Act's preamble. These clauses tell much about how the legis-
lature perceived the problem of organized crime and how that
problem is connected to RICO's statutory remedies. The first
clause characterizes the national scope of organized crime as so-
phisticated and diverse, "drain[ing] billions of dollars from the na-
tional economy. '49 In the second clause the problem is considered
on a state level: "Organized crime . . . engages in the same pat-
47. Id. § 895.02(4).
48. Id. § 895.05(7). This section provides that "[any person who is injured by reason of
any violation of the provisions of § 895.03 shall have a cause of action for threefold the
actual damages sustained and, when appropriate, punitive damages." Id.
49. Ch. 77-334, 1977 Fla. Laws 1399, 1400.
1987]
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terns of unlawful conduct which characterize its activities in other
states."50 But for the purpose of the temporary injunctive relief
sought in Finkelstein, the most revealing clause is the final one
which seeks to solve the mischief of organized crime: "Whereas, in
order to successfully resist and eliminate such infiltration, it is nec-
essary to provide new criminal and civil remedies and proce-
dures."51 Florida's RICO Act attempted to provide such a new
remedy to RICO plaintiffs through the provision of less stringent
requirements for obtaining a temporary injunction than had ex-
isted at common law. It did so in recognition of a new and more
sophisticated type of criminal activity now in existence. It is unfor-
tunate that the Fourth District desiccated the remedy before it
could ever be put to use.
V. THE FOURTH DISTRICT'S APPROACH
The court took a circuitous route in determining whether the
Florida RICO Act permitted Mrs. Finkelstein to dispose of her
trust fund assets. Instead of looking at the Florida statute, the os-
tensible starting point for any inquiry regarding legislative intent,
the court incorrectly began its analysis by reviewing the federal
RICO statute, which is worded differently from its Florida ana-
logue, and which by the court's own admission, "does not contain
an express provision for injunctive relief such as that contained in
Florida RICO. '5 2 Once the court determined that the federal stat-
ute did not provide for temporary injunctive relief-which of
course was the central issue before the court and hence the only
50. Id.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Finkelstein, 490 So. 2d at 979. Even under the federal statute, Southeast Bank might
have been entitled to injunctive relief, especially in view of the federal statute's liberal inter-
pretation clause. See Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Ben-
net v. Berg, 58 NoT'r DAME LAW. 237, 238 (1982). See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982) ("prevent
and restrain violations of section 1962 of this Chapter by issuing appropriate orders"). In
light of this clause and the statute's legislative history, it ought to be held to authorize
temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, receiverships, and the full range of
ultimate equity relief on the request of the government or private parties. Because the
source of jurisidiction is statutory, restrictive precedent ought not to be held to narrow the
ability of the court to do justice. Sponsors said the federal RICO statute would not be
"limit[ed to] the remedies ... already. . . established. The ability of our chancery courts
to formulate a remedy to fit the wrong is one of the great benefits of our system of justice."
115 CONG. REc. 9567 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan). Nevertheless, litigants and the
courts have been cautious, or even hostile, to redeeming RICO's promise of new relief for old
wrongs. But see USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982)
(holding that plaintiffs under federal RICO Act could sequester assets).
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reason to compare the two statutes-the inquiry should have
ceased completely. Unfortunately, it did not, and a cryptic exami-
nation of federal cases construing the federal RICO Act ensued.
The first of these cases was USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin En-
ergy53 in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in
issuing a temporary injunction freezing the defendant's assets. The
injunction issued to protect the rights of the plaintiff corporation
to restitution of funds obtained by the defendant's breach of a fi-
duciary duty. The Fourth District cited the USACO Coal decision,
observing that "[flederal courts have granted injunctions in RICO
cases . . . on grounds other than the RICO statute."' Although
the Fourth District's review of a federal court's interpretation of a
federal statute was a superfluous exercise for purposes of gaining a
better understanding of the Florida statute, it nevertheless man-
aged to miss the clear implication of the USACO Coal holding.
What the USACO Coal decision should have suggested to the
Fourth District is that if the Sixth Circuit managed to provide in-
junctive relief under the federal RICO statute, notwithstanding the
absence of any express statutory provisions for doing so, then a
fortiori nothing prevented the court from granting the same relief
when a statute expressly provided such a remedy.
In USACO Coal, the Sixth Circuit used creative jurisprudence in
permitting a temporary injunction to protect "assets for which the
defendants may be accountable under a constructive trust. ' 56 This
was necessary because the defendants had argued that the federal
"RICO is not a 'federal statute' under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 64(1) that
authorizes prejudgment sequestration for the satisfaction of a civil
damage claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)." '56 In other words, the
statute did not authorize temporary injunctions in order to prevent
prejudgment disposal of assets. Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit
turned to the common law doctrine that a constructive trust arises
where a fiduciary duty is breached, and that the trial court had
issued the injunction not "to secure a RICO treble damages award
• . . but rather. . . to protect rights to reach the defendants' prop-
erty as a result of the allegation of breach of fiduciary duty."5 The
USACO Coal case therefore represents an example of a court turn-
53. 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982).
54. Finkelstein, 490 So. 2d at 979-80.
55. USACO Coal Co., 689 F.2d at 97.
56. Id. at 96.
57. Id. at 97.
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ing to a common law remedy where a statute has proved unsuitable
for reaching a just result. That the Fourth District cited the opin-
ion at all in view of the explicit statutory provisions in Florida's
RICO Act is an indication of the extent to which the court misap-
prehended the statute's mandate.
The Fourth District next discussed Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Gleave.55
In Ashland Oil, a federal district court denied a motion for a pre-
liminary injunction which would have restrained the defendants
from transferring their tangible assets. The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants had stolen 375,000 gallons of gasoline by tampering
with gas loading meters so as to constitute a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity under RICO.59 The Ashland Oil case has been criti-
cized as "poorly reasoned and wrongly decided."' 0 What is impor-
tant, however, is that the Fourth District misunderstood the result
of Ashland Oil. Instead of "grant[ing] preliminary injunctive relief
restraining defendants from transferring their tangible assets or
properties," 61 the Ashland Oil court denied preliminary injunctive
relief.2 It is unclear how the Fourth District misconstrued Ash-
land Oil. In any event, it is ironic that the Fourth District looked
to the wrong court for a tenuous and quite possibly wrongly de-
cided construction of the wrong statute and then cited the case for
the wrong proposition.
The Fourth District's introduction of ITT Community Develop-
ment Corp. v. Barton" foreshadowed its subsequent misapplica-
tion of the decision. The court observed that "several cases not
involving RICO have rejected injunctive relief in cases similar to
this one."' 64 The statement is internally inconsistent; ITT Commu-
nity Development was not a RICO case and was therefore inappo-
site to the dispute before the court. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to grant injunctive reliefas in
ITT Community Development, demonstrating the failure of the
common law to assist courts in preserving assets, a function which
58. 540 F. Supp. 81 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
59. Id. at 82.
60. See Blakey, supra note 52, at 339.40.
61. Finkelstein, 490 So. 2d at 980 (emphasis added).
62. Ashland Oil, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 81, 85 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). "I thus conclude that the
principle adhered to by virtually every court that has considered the matter . . .forbids
reading authority to order an attachment or the equivalent thereof into cases brought by
private parties under 18 U.S.C. § 1964." Id.
63. 569 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1978).
64. Finkelstein, 490 So. 2d at 980.
65. ITT Community Dev. Corp., 569 F.2d at 1361.
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would assure plaintiffs some recovery in the event of a successful
verdict. ITT Community Development was relevant to Finkelstein
only in this unintended and ironic way. Under no circumstances
could the decision have properly governed the outcome in
Finkelstein."
The Finkelstein court then reiterated the four common law re-
quirements for injunctive relief which Florida courts have gener-
ally recognized: "(1) irreparable harm; (2) a clear legal right; (3) an
inadequate remedy at law; (4) consideration of the public inter-
est. '' 67 Although the court acknowledged that "[t]he Florida RICO
Act has eliminated the necessity of showing special or irreparable
damage as a prerequisite to recovery," 8 it misread the directive of
section 895.05(6). According to the court, the statute merely sub-
stituted for the generic requirement of showing irreparable harm
"the requirement of showing immediate danger of significant loss
or damage. '"69 In other words, the Florida Legislature, in enacting
RICO, merely removed the "irreparable harm" requirement and
put in its place "immediate danger of significant loss." In the
court's view, the other three requirements of clear legal right, inad-
equate remedy at law, and consideration of public interest were
left intact and had to be met. As for why the legislature would
undertake to make such a minor change in the law-indeed, why it
attempted to make any change whatsoever-the court offered no
explanation. What is significant for courts confronted in the future
with the statute is that the Fourth District's construction of sec-
tion 895.05(6) was wrong.
The Fourth District's misunderstanding of section 895.05(6) was
a direct result of its failure to distinguish between two separate
and quite different forms of injunctive relief available to plaintiffs
suing under RICO. The first form of injunctive relief, which ap-
pears in section 895.05(1), Florida Statutes, is more permanent in
nature and encompasses a broad range of remedies from divest-
ment of interests in legal enterprises to "forfeiture of the charter of
a corporation organized under the laws of the state. 7 0 Had South-
66. St. Lawrence Co. v. Alkow Realty, Inc., 453 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) and
Acquafredda v. Messina, 408 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), cases cited by the Fourth
District, do not concern injunctive relief sought under Florida's RICO Act and therefore
were also irrelevant.
67. Finkelstein, 490 So. 2d at 980.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 981.
70. FLA. STAT. § 895.05(1) (1985).
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east Bank been seeking injunctive relief under section 895.05(1),
the Fourth District would have been correct in its application of
common law principles because the statute provides that "[i]n
such a proceeding, relief shall be granted in conformity with the
principles that govern the granting of injunctive relief from
threatened loss or damage in other civil cases. '71 But Southeast
Bank had not requested any of the more permanent measures of
relief listed in section 895.05(1). Rather, the bank sought a tempo-
rary injunction under section 895.05(6).72 Why, then, did the court
proceed to analyze Southeast Bank's request for a temporary in-
junction under a section of the statute which concerned permanent
injunctions?
In all likelihood, the court did so because it ignored the first sen-
tence of section 895.05(6), which states: "Any aggrieved person
may institute a proceeding under subsection (1)." 73 This language
directs the reader to refer back to subsection one in order to better
understand the nature and extent of the relief for which that sub-
section provides. If, however, the reader fails to follow the statute's
directive he could mistakenly conclude that: (1) section 895.05(6)
deals solely with temporary injunctions since only by reference to
subsection one does that section expressly mention any other rem-
edies, (2) temporary injunctions are to be governed in accordance
with Florida law except that special or irreparable damages no
longer need be shown, (3) in the place of the former requirement of
special or irreparable damages the statute substitutes the require-
ment of "immediate danger of significant loss or damage," and (4)
a bond must be posted in order to obtain the remedy.
It is purely a matter of conjecture as to why the Fourth District
chose to interpret the statute as it did. But if the court had not
concluded that the statute provided only one remedy, then how
does one explain the following observation: "The Florida RICO Act
and Anti-Fencing Act provide that in such a proceeding [i.e., a pro-
ceeding where a temporary injunction is being sought], relief shall
be granted in conformity with the principles that govern the grant-
ing of injunctive relief from threatened loss or damage in other
civil cases."' 74 It is difficult, if not impossible, to justify the conclu-
sion that Florida's common law principles regarding temporary in-
junctions must be adhered to under section 895.05(6) unless one
71. Id. § 895.05(6).
72. Finkelstein, 490 So. 2d at 978-79.
73. FLA. STAT. § 895.05(6) (1985).
74. Finkelstein, 490 So. 2d at 980.
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makes the additional conclusion that the reference of the adverbial
clause "[iun such proceeding" refers to temporary injunctions.
Thus, it must also be true that the court, in reaching this conclu-
sion, failed to read the preceding sentence, which reveals that the
"proceeding" described in the second sentence of section 895.05(6)
is found in subsection one. Hence, the court never understood that
the statute provided for a different and more permanent form of
injunctive relief, and the court incorrectly construed section
895.05(6) as providing solely for one form of relief-temporary
injunctions.
Once it is understood that section 895.05(6) concerns both per-
manent and temporary injunctive relief-and that in the case of
permanent injunctive relief courts should adhere to Florida's com-
mon law principles, with the exception of the irreparable harm
component with which the statute dispenses-then the only matter
left for a court to consider is which form of relief is being re-
quested. If a party is seeking a temporary injunction, as was
Southeast Bank, then section 895.05(6) merely requires "the execu-
tion of proper bond against damages improvidently granted and a
showing of immediate danger of significant loss or damage. 7 5 The
record in Finkelstein revealed that Southeast Bank had posted
such a bond.76 Given the tenuous and self-serving testimony of
Margaret Finkelstein regarding the source of approximately
$31,000 which she deposited into her family trust," the likelihood
of "immediate danger of significant loss" to Southeast Bank should
have been obvious to the Fourth District and the injunction should
have been granted as a matter of law.
Because of the Fourth District's initial derailment in construing
section 895.05(6), it is not surprising that the remainder of the de-
cision is flawed. The court reviewed the evidence presented to the
trial court and found that Southeast Bank did not have a "clear
legal right" to a temporary injunction. 8 In addition, the court
found that Margaret Finkelstein had not engaged in a "pattern of
racketeering activity" under section 895.02(4), and that the Finkel-
75. FLA. STAT. § 895.05(6) (1985).
76. Finkelstein, 490 So. 2d at 979. Southeast posted an injunction bond in the sum of
$25,000.00. Id.
77. Id. at 981. The Fourth District reprimanded the trial court for "conclud[ing] that the
approximate $31,000 deficiency represented the profits of racketeering." The district court
found that "this conclusion was not supported by the record, since Margaret did testify as
to the source of $31,000." Id. As to the substance or probative value of Margaret Finkel-
stein's testimony, the district court was silent.
78. Id. at 982.
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stein family trust was not an "enterprise" under section
895.02(3)." But because section 895.05(6) does not require a show-
ing of "clear legal right" nor indicia suggesting a "pattern of racke-
teering activity," and does not mandate any demonstration of a
RICO type "enterprise" as a prelude to temporary injunctive relief,
the consideration of these factors was irrelevant. For precisely the
same reasons, the court's discussion of "public interest" and "inad-
equate remedy at law" was surplusage."s In light of the Fourth Dis-
trict's error-ridden path it is not surprising that it rejected South-
east Bank's request for the imposition of a constructive trust,
notwithstanding the other remedies that easily could have served
the same purpose.81
VI. CONCLUSION
The temporary injunction has proved a durable remedy through-
out the history of English and American jurisprudence. Although
courts have sometimes altered its requirements, it has remained a
popular tool for preserving the status quo pending the outcome of
litigation.
The difficulty in obtaining a temporary injunction is directly at-
tributable to the traditional separation of courts of law and courts
of equity. This separation no longer exists in Florida s8 and the leg-
islature's relaxation of the remedy's traditional requirements in the
Florida RICO Act reflects recognition that comity, once properly
considered by equity courts, is less relevant today. Nevertheless,
there are legitimate reasons for caution when granting a temporary
injunction because it may result in a change of the parties' posi-
tions prior to a trial on the merits.
79. Id. at 981-82.
80. Id. at 982-83.
81. One such possibility would have been an equitable lien. Professor Scott observes that
[t]his principle is applicable where a part of the mingled fund is used in aquiring
property. Thus if B wrongfully mingles $1,000 of his own with $1,000 of A's
money, and withdraws and dissipates $1,000, and with the remaining $1,000 he
purchases a piece of land, A is entitled to a constructive trust of one-half of the
land. If the land is or becomes worth more than $2,000, A is entitled to one-half of
the profit thus made. If the land is worth less than $2,000, by enforcing a con-
structive trust as to half, A would get less than $1,000, and therefore be well ad-
vised to enforce an equitable lien upon the land for $1,000.
4 A. Scorr, Scorr ON TRUSTS 3305 (1930).
82. From the standpoint of pleading, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure have col-
lapsed the distinction between law and equity. "There shall be one form of action to be
known as 'civil action.'" FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(g).
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Whenever courts are presented with the task of construing a
statute which other jurisdictions have not yet interpreted, they
should first determine what the common law was before the stat-
ute was enacted, ascertain its defects, inquire as to how the legisla-
ture sought to cure those defects, and seek to understand the rea-
son for the cure the legislature chose. This is the proper and time-
proven approach to statutory construction, and it is as workable
today as it was in Lord Coke's day.
The ultimate failure of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
Finkelstein v. Southeast Bank was its misconstruction of section
895.05(6), Florida Statutes. Although every question as to whether
Southeast Bank was entitled to a temporary injunction enjoining
the dissipation of the Finkelstein trust fund was directly answera-
ble from the unambiguous wording of the statute, the court treated
the whole matter as though it turned on the federal statute and
several federal decisions. The court never came to grips with the
central issue on appeal, which concerned a statutory provided by
the Florida Legislature.
The implications for plaintiffs seeking temporary injunctive re-
lief under Florida's RICO statute after the Finkelstein decision are
grim. A RICO plaintiff is automatically at odds with organized
crime, and commentators have noted the dangers which surround
litigating under such circumstances. 8 If in addition to these dan-
gers, the private party suing under RICO also must face the
probability that no assets will be present upon judgment, there will
be little if any incentive for suing under the statute at all. The
federal government, despite the superior resources and remedies at
its disposal, has encountered great difficulty in preventing organ-
ized crime from avoiding judicial enforcement of RICO violations.8
83. See Blakey, supra note 52, at 302. Professor Blakey has observed that "one facet of
contemporary organized crime violence that is historically unique in the United States is the
extent to which it is directed toward judicial and prosecutive officials." See, e.g., 3 are found
guilty in Assassination of Federal Judge, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1982, at 16, col.1 (late ed.)
(conviction of killers of Judge John H. Wood, Jr.); 2 Indicted for Murder of Judge, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 16, 1982, at B7, col.1 (late city ed.) (indictment of a hired killer and narcotics
smuggler charged with murder of a federal judge scheduled to preside over drug case against
them); Drug Gangs Threaten Judges and Prosecutors, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1982, at 31,
col.1 (late city ed.) (review of plots against judges, prosecutors, and investigators taking part
in drug cases).
84. Blakey, supra note 52, at 260 n.59. Professor Blakey has summarized the problems
that the federal government has encountered: (1) disparity of wealth between plaintiff and
defendant, (2) difficulty in ascertaining assets, (3) difficulty in reaching assets in the hands
of third parties, (4) preventing dissipation of assets before trial, and (5) better counsel af-
fordable to organized crime members because of their vast financial resources.
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It can only be anticipated that private citizens will be even less
successful under Florida RICO under Finkelstein.
Paul McCaskill
